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The transfer of ownership in real property is usually characterised by an
outright grant of the fee simple which operates to vest an absolute interest
in the grantee. Sometimes, however, land is conveyed in circumstances
where the grantor purports to reserve a right to recover the property if a
stipulated event occurs or if the grantee does, or abstains from doing, a
particular thing. Depending upon the form of the instrument, this may
give rise to a determinable fee simple or a fee simple upon condition
subsequent.
Such dispositions have proven to be an unpredictable vehicle for the
grantor's intentions, the ultimate effect of which has often turned upon
subtle distinctions beyond the contemplation of the original parties. The
common law has been a vigilant guardian of these distinctions,
consigning them, in the process, to the treacherous realm of literal
construction. A long list of cases attest to the consequences of a minor
oversight or inattention to detail. The decisions tend to cluster around
two issues which will provide the foundation of this article: the
dispositive effect of a grant and the relationship of the interests to the rule
against perpetuities. With regard to former, this article will focus on the
manner in which conditional and determinable fees are created, with
particular emphasis upon the technical construction of documents.
Discussion of the latter will principally concern the application of the
common law rule against perpetuities and the impact of legislative
changes that have been introduced in a number of jurisdictions. In
addition, reference will be made to certain statutes that serve to qualify
or curtail these estates. Finally, it will be asked whether reforms to date
have laid a sufficient basis for the future role of conditional and
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**I am grateful to Arthur L. Close, Q.C. Chairman, Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia, for his assistance during the course of my research and for his constructive critique
of a previous draft of this article. I would also like to thank Bruce D. Woolley of the Faculty
of Law, University of British Columbia, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
article.
Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry
determinable fees. The underlying analysis will be directed to whether
both estates in their current form can be justified in terms of the function
they fulfil and the effectiveness with which that function is accomplished.
II. The Interests Defined
The respective interests should be defined at the outset. A fee simple upon
condition subsequent' arises when the grant of a fee simple is qualified by
an independent condition which provides that the interest conveyed shall
be defeated upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of a certain event,
which constitutes a breach of that condition. If such a breach takes place,
the grantor has a right of re-entry to terminate the grantee's estate.2
Breach of a condition subsequent therefore renders the grantee's interest
voidable at the instance of the grantor. Until this right is exercised, the
estate continues.3
In contrast, a determinable fee simple creates a limitation on the estate
that is granted. If the specified event occurs, the interest of the grantee is
automatically brought to an end and the estate reverts to the grantor. The
grantor's interest is termed a possibility of reverter. If at any time it is
established that the determining event cannot occur, the possibility of
reverter is extinguished and the grantee's interest becomes absolute.
It is apparent that a conditional and determinable fee give rise to
different estates. A condition subsequent is added to what is already a
transfer of an absolute interest. The full estate is granted subject to
possible future forfeiture. Conversely, a determinable fee transmits less
than the full estate, the determining event marking the limit of the interest
conveyed. Maudsley and Burn express the distinction thus:
There is a basic difference between determinable interests and interests
upon condition. The former is a grant of something less than the interest
specified; the latter is a grant of the interest subject to a liability to be cut
down. To give land to trustees so long as it is used for Church purposes is
a grant less than a fee simple. To give land to trustees in fee simple subject
to a condition that the fee simple shall terminate if the land is not used for
Church purposes is a fee simple subject to a condition. The difference is
that between an eleven inch ruler and a foot ruler subject to the last inch
being cut off.4
1. This may be contrasted with a condition precedent, which relates to the commencement, as
opposed to the termination, of an interest.
2. An estate may be granted inter vivos by deed, or devised by will. The terms "grantor" and
"grantee" are used here to include both forms of disposition.
3. Halsbury makes the point succinctly: "An estate upon condition cannot be defeated without
actual entry or claim equivalent to entry. It is not ipsofacto defeated by the happening of the
critical event." (39 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (1982) at 280, para. 399).
4. R.H. Maudsley and E.H. Burn, Land Law: Cases and Materials, 2nd. ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1970) at 24.
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Canadian jurisprudence has recognised these distinct interests for over
a century. In Re Melville5 a certain parcel of land was sold to a
municipality for the purpose of erecting a school house. The conveyance
was subject, inter alia, to the condition that
[I]f the Municipal Council should at any time thereafter sell, lease, alien,
transfer or convey the said land, or any part thereof, then the indenture
was to be null and void, and it should be lawful for the said John Le
Breton and his heirs to re-enter the said land and premises and avoid the
estate of the said Municipal Council.6
The grantee later sold the land and thereby breached the condition. In
addressing the status of his provision, Mr. Justice Proudfoot of the
Chancery Division of the Ontario High Court classified both a
determinable fee simple and a fee simple upon condition subsequent as a
species of condition subsequent. The former was described as a
conditional limitation, the latter as a condition of re-entry or a condition
strictly so called. Despite the use of a slightly different form of
nomenclature, the following observations accurately reflect the present
understanding of these interests:
A conditional limitation operates to determine the estate by the intrinsic
force of the limitation; in the event prescribed by the terms of the
condition the estate ceases. A condition operates by reserving a right of re-
entry to the grantor and his heirs; in the event prescribed the estate
becomes defeasible by entry, but until entry the estate continues.7
It was found that there was a valid condition subsequent with a
concomitant right of entry for its breach. Accordingly the land resulted to
the grantor's estate.8
This basic statement of principle was adopted by Chief Justice
Meredith of the Common Pleas Division of the Ontario High Court in Re
St. Patrick's Market9 and the Appellate Division of the Ontario Supreme
Court in Matheson v. Town of MitchelL 10
5. (1886), 11 O.R. 626 (Ont. H.C.).
6. Ibid at 628.
7. Ibid at631.
8. In this case the Court upheld a condition of unlimited duration. Prima facie the provision
seems to offend the rule against perpetuities (see infra.). However, the issue does not appear
to have been raised either in argument or in the judgement; to this extent the decision was
perhaps rendered per incuriam See Barlow J. in Fitzmaurice v. The Board of School Trustees
of the Township of Monck, [1949] O.W.N. 786 at 788 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Fitzmaurice v.
Township of Monck].
9. (1909), 1 O.W.N. 92.
10. (1919), 51 D.L.R. 477, 46 O.L.R. 546 [hereinafter Matheson v. Town of Mitchell cited to
O.L.R.]
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III. Construction of Deeds
While conditional and determinable interests are conceptually distinct, at
a practical level the distinction has proven to be problematic. It is not
uncommon to find that a document has failed to adequately define the
interest it was intended to create. In turn it has fallen to the courts to
determine the status of such dispositions. Given the nature of the task,
courts have understandably sought recourse to the technical canons of
construction. In the process, form and substance have become
inextricably linked. Not infrequently the effect of a deed has hinged upon
narrow considerations of drafting. In this regard two matters require
attention: first, the terminology describing the interest, and second, the
manner in which this information is recorded in the document. In
addition, some confusion has arisen as to the relationship between
conditions and covenants. More particularly, there is uncertainty as to
how readily a covenant should be imputed as a substitute for an invalid
condition. These topics will now be separately examined.
1. The Language of an Instrument
The language of an instrument is intended to illuminate the grantor's
intentions. However, in the area under review, the task of interpretation
is frequently undertaken in circumstances that can at best be described as
murky. The essential determination can be simply stated: at issue is
whether a qualification has been added to an outright grant or whether
a limitation has been imposed on the estate itself. Often the distinction is
a fine one. For example, the following clauses have been construed as
creating a fee simple upon condition subsequent:
[S]hould the said parcel or tract of land at any time hereafter cease to be
used for the purposes for which it is hereby granted the said lands... shall
revert to the said party of the first part ... on payment ... of Seventy five
dollars."I
[O]n the condition that this property is to be held and used for all time for
civic purposes in perpetuity. 2
[T]he above described property is to be used for school purposes only and
the said grantor reserve[s] to himself and his heirs the preference to buy the
said property at the current price should the same ceased [sic] to be used
for the purposes intended.' 3
11. Re North Gower Township Public School Board and Todd (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 421 at
422-3, [1968] 1 O.R. 63 at 64-5 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Re North Gower cited to D.L.R.].
12. City of Moncton v. The Queen in right of Canada (1987), 46 R.P.R. 202 at 204
(N.B.Q.B.).
13. Re Essex County Roman Catholic Separate School Board and Antaya (1977), 80 D.L.R.
(3d) 405 at 407, 17 O.R. (2d) 307 at 309 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Re Essex cited to D.L.R.].
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On the other hand, the following have established a determinable fee
simple:
Doth grant unto the said parties of the Third Part... for so long as it shall
be used and needed for school purposes and no longer.' 4
[To trustees] for the purposes of the Orphan Girls' Home at Kendal...
and on failure of the said trust ... to be held upon such [other] trusts
15
[T]o the charity school.., so long as it shall continue to be endowed with
charity. 16
It is evident that the status of a disposition can turn upon subtle verbal
distinctions.' 7 At the same time, individual words and clauses cannot be
studied in isolation because conflicting terminology may be used
interchangeably in the same document. Thus, mere reference to a
possibility of reverter will not in itself be conclusive of a determinable fee
if the grant predominantly discloses the characteristics of a fee simple
upon condition subsequent. 8 Similarly, a separate clause of defeasance
will fail to establish a condition subsequent when a determinable fee is
otherwise indicated. 9 Accordingly, only by viewing the instrument as a
whole is it possible to categorise the interest it has created.
A further complication arises with respect to conditions in that courts
generally place a narrow interpretation upon provisions conferring a right
of re-entry. In the words of Anger and Honsberger:
[S]ince a condition appended to an estate may lead to forfeiture, the law
has been jealous in its scrutiny of conditions subsequent and will readily
hold them void as offending public policy, as incapable of performance, or
for uncertainty.20
14. Re Tilbury West Public School Board and Hastie (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 407 at 408,
[ 1966] 2 O.R. 20 at 21 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Re Tilbury cited to D.L.R.].
15. Re Cooper's Conveyance Trusts, Crewdson v. Bagot, [1956] 3 All E.R. 28 at 29-30, 1
W.L.R. 1096 at 1098 (Ch.D.).
16. Attorney General v. Pyle (1738), 26 E.R. 278 at 278 (Ch.).
17. The extent of such subtlety was captured by Grant J. (citing R.E. Megarry and H.W.R.
Wade, The Law of Real Property, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959 at 77) in Re Tilbury,
supra, note 14 at 411:
[A] devise to a school in fee simple 'until it ceases to publish its accounts' creates a
determinable fee, whereas a devise to the school in fee simple 'on condition that the
accounts are published annually' creates a fee simple defeasible by condition
subsequent ....
18. See Re North Gower, supra, note 11 at 422-24.
19. See Re Tilbury, supra, note 14 at 411-12.
20. Anger and Honsberger, Law of Real Property, vol. 1, 2nd ed. by A.H. Oosterhoff and
W.N. Rayner (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1985) at 127, para. 505.5. It seems that the
requirement of certainty to which the authors refer, is applied with particular vigour: see
Clavering P. Ellison (1859), 11 E.R. 282, 29 L.J. Ch. 761 (H.L.), Re Viscount Exmouth
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An abiding concern is that whatever the form, the grantor's objective
may be the same in each case, namely to bring an end to the grantee's
estate if a specified event occurs. Nevertheless, an infelicity of the
draftsman's pen has not infrequently served to defeat a grantor's true
intent. Courts have readily commented upon the different consequences
that would flow from a modified wording,21 but it has generally been
considered beyond their purview to re-cast documents so as to
accommodate a particular result.
In one recent case however, judicial intervention has taken the more
active form of ordering rectification. In Re Village of Caroline and
Roper,22 an owner of land, TR, gave permission to a community group
to construct a hall on a portion of his property. This was on the
understanding that the hall would only be used for community purposes.
In due course the building was constructed, with TR retaining title to the
land. Upon TR's death the land passed to his widow, RR. In 1949 the
community association decided to make further improvements to the hall
and before undertaking this, RR was asked to convey the land to the
association. RR agreed to do so providing the property would continue
to be used as a community centre. She was given a document that stated:
"This acre ... Shall revert back to the Late Thomas Roper Estate if used
for other than a community centre. ' 23 In 1982 the hall was destroyed by
fire and the present owner, the Village of Caroline proposed to sell the
land for commercial use. The Village, as successor to the community
group, had acquired the property with notice of the condition. The
Village sought a declaration that the condition, as to use, contained in the
document given to RR was void as infringing the rule against
perpetuities. Mr. Justice Cavanagh reviewed the distinction between a
determinable fee and a fee simple on condition subsequent and held that
the provision in question was a condition that contemplated a future act
of defeasance which may or may not occur at some indefinite date. As
such it was void. However, Cavanagh J. proceeded to find that the
document did not reflect the true intentions of the parties and ordered
rectification,
(1883), 23 Ch. 158 (Ch. D.), Re Sandbrook, [1912] 2 Ch. 471 (Ch. D.), Sifton v. Sifton,
[1938] 3 D.L.R. 577, [1938] O.R. 529 (P.C.), Clayton v. Ramsden, [1943] A.C. 320, [1943]
1 All E.R. 16 (H.L.), Re Brace (decd), Gurton v. Clements, [1954] 2 All E.R. 354 (Ch. D.)
and Re Down, [ 1968] 2 O.R. 16 (Ont. C.A.).
21. e.g. Re St. Patrick's Market, supra, note 9 at 93, Matheson v. Town of Mitchell, supra, note
10 at 548, Fitzmaurice P. Township of Monck, supra, note 8 at 787-88.
22. (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 761 (Alta Q.B.) [hereinafter Caroline and Roper].
23. Ibid at 762.
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.. . to show that the transferees received title to the property as trustees for
as long as the property was used as a community centre and to be
conveyed back to the Ropers at the end of that use.24
The document as rectified qualified the Village's enjoyment of the estate
in words denoting a determinable fee.25 It was further directed that the
property be conveyed back to TR's estate.
In satisfying himself as to the appropriateness of rectification,
Cavanagh J. cited with approval the judgment of the Ontario Court of
Appeal in HE Clarke Ltd v. Thermidaire Corp. Ltd 26 In Clarke Mr.
Justice Brooke stated that the parties must have reached complete
agreement as to the terms, but failed to record them correctly in
accordance with their prior intentions. Cavanagh J. concluded:
Here the evidence is undisputed that the intention was to preserve the
Ropers' rights. That intention continued to the making of the document by
an unfortunate use of words. The document does not protect that intention
as the parties intended that it should.27
It is submitted that for practical purposes the remedy of rectification
should be viewed with caution in the context of determinable and
conditional fees. First, most cases are resolved solely as a matter of
interpretation of deeds and ancillary documents. In these instances, while
prior oral discussions undoubtedly took place, they usually fall outside
the enquiry of the court. This approach was not adopted in Caroline and
Roper. A factor that may have had some bearing is that the respondent,
the son of TR and RR, was one of the original parties to the negotiations
that culminated in production of the document that was provided to RR
as an inducement to transferring title. It may be conjectured that the
presence of an actual party to the original transaction and the opportunity
for specificity of recall in respect of the terms of the agreement, were
persuasive in encouraging the Court to look beyond documentary
evidence. These circumstances, however, are relatively uncommon and
most actions are heard after the original parties' demise.
Secondly, Cavanagh J. ruled that the agreement, which was drafted by
laymen, did not adequately reflect their intention to preserve the grantor's
24. Ibid at 765.
25. It may be noted that rectification, being an equitable remedy, is not usually available
where there has been a long delay. In Caroline and Roper the period between execution of the
document and its rectification was 38 years. However, it is possible to rationalise this relief on
the basis that it was granted within a relatively short time from the date of the proposed change
of use, being the effective cause of the dispute. The precise time is not clear from the law reports
but it would not in any event have exceeded 5 years.
26. (1973), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 13, [1973] 2 O.R. 57.
27. Caroline and Roper, supra, note 22 at 765.
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rights. However, it may be argued that it is unlikely that the parties would
have addressed the nuances of a determinable and conditional fee or the
ultimate effect of each. The terminology of the document indicated a
condition subsequent and this was not incompatible with the parties'
objectives. This disposition would have entitled re-entry for condition
broken. Its enforceability would in turn depend upon other factors,
particularly whether the condition was of limited or unlimited duration.
The substitution of a determinable fee undoubtedly produced the most
favourable result for the grantor, but this initiative draws close to
Hanbury's stricture28 that the remedy of rectification exists to correct, not
improve an instrument.29
2. The General Form of an Instrument
The ultimate effect of an instrument may depend not only upon the
manner in which the interests are described, but also upon the precise
placement of such descriptions within the scheme of the document. A
qualification to a grant may be inserted in the recitals, grant, habendum
or in an independent clause elsewhere. The consequences of each are not
necessarily the same and certain rules of construction will determine the
status of conditions or limitations that purport to modify an absolute
grant. In this connection a few basic principles may be stated.
First, the incorporation of a right of re-entry or possibility of reverter
in the granting clause will furnish the most cogent evidence of a residuary
interest in the grantor. Thus, Mr. Justice Grant, in construing a deed as
creating a determinable fee simple, remarked:
I am influenced to such a conclusion by reason that the words 'so long as
it shall be used and needed for school purposes and no longer' are used in
the granting clause and they are words denoting a determinable fee.
Another indication is that the limit of the estate granted is set in such
28. Hanbury's Modem Equity, 9th ed. by R.H. Maudsley (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969) at
661.
29. In this context the words of Lord Selborne in Pearks v. Moseley (1880), 5 App. Cas. 714
at 719 (H.L.) seem particularly apposite:
You do not import the law of remoteness into the construction of the instrument by
which you investigate the expressed intention of the testator. You take his words, and
endeavour to arrive at their meaning, exactly in the same manner as if there had been
no such law, and as if the whole intention expressed by the words could lawfully take
effect. I do not mean, that, in dealing with words which are obscure and ambiguous,
weight, even in a question of remoteness, may not sometimes be given to the
consideration that it is better to effectuate than to destroy the intention; but I do say,
that, if the construction of the words is one about which a court would have no doubt,
though there was no law of remoteness, that construction cannot be altered, or wrested
to something different, for the purpose of escaping from the consequences of that law.
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granting clause itself as distinguished from a case where the fee absolute is
qualified independently. 30
Secondly, the grant may be expressed to convey an absolute interest
while the recitals or habendum may appear to curtail it. As a general
proposition, the grant prevails in respect of any conflict with the recitals 31
and the habendum.3 2 If the grant is absolute, it would seem that any
abrogation therefrom contained elsewhere in the deed is, by definition,
inimical to the absolute nature of that disposition. In that sense any
qualification could be characterised as a conflict which should
theoretically be overridden. However, this approach has not been applied
in its fullest vigour. To do so would ignore the function of the habendum
which is to limit the estate.33 Effect is given to the habendum providing
it is not repugnant to the grant.34 Thus a habendum imposing a restriction
on an outright conveyance is not necessarily repugnant thereto even
though it may introduce an interest such as a right of re-entry which
could potentially defeat the estate granted.
On the other hand, recitals have a less significant role in the
interpretation of documents, particularly because they are contained
within the non-operative part.35 If the operative part of a deed is
unambiguous the recitals will usually be disregarded. In the limited
situation where the operative part is unclear, recitals may be invoked in
order to explain the context of the agreement. 36 Not surprisingly, words
in a recital that conflict with a grant are more readily displaced than
provisions in a habendum.
30. Re Tilbury, supra, note 14 at 411.
31. 12 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (1975) at 638-39, paras 1509 and 1510. See also
Mackenzie v. Duke of Devonshire, [1896] A.C. 400 (H.L,), Powell v. City of Vancouver (1912),
1 W.W.R. 1022 (B.C.S.C.). Affirmed on appeal (1912), 8 D.L.R. 24, 3 W.W.R. 108 and 161
(B.C.C.A.), Commissioners ofInland Revenue v. Raphael [1935] A.C. 96 (H.L.).
32. Halsbury, supra, note 31 at 659, para. 1536. See also Meyers v. Marsh (1852), 9
U.C.Q.B.R. 242 (Ont. Q.B.), Jameson v. The London and Canadian Loan and Agency
Company (1897), 27 S.C.R. 435, Purcell v. Tully (1906), 12 O.L.R. 5 (H.C.), Re Sherlock and
Green, [1949] 3 D.L.R. 476 (Ont. H.C.), Smith v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554.
33. Halsbury, supra, note 31 at 658, para. 1534.
34. Odgers' Construction of Deeds and Statutes, 5th ed. by G. Dworkin (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1967) at 200-203. See also Spencer v. Registrar of Titles, [1906] A.C. 503 (P.C.) and
Hunter v. Munn, [1962] OWN. 250 (C.A.).
35. Odgers' Construction of Deeds and Statutes, supra, note 34, divides deeds into the basic
categories of "Non-Operative Elements" (date, parties and recitals) and the "Operative Part"
(containing the premises including the grant, and the description of the parcels, the habendum,
and covenants).
36. Halsbury, supra, note 31 at 638, para. 1509, and at 640, para. 1511; Odgers' Construction
of Deeds and Statutes, supra, note 34 at 152-54.
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The Ontario High Court decision in Re McKellar37 illustrates the
treatment of a recital and habendum which conflicted with each other as
well as the grant. The Court was called upon to determine the status of
a deed where the grant clause was without apparent limitation, but the
recital provided that the grantor had,
[A]greed to grant.., the lands... but only so long as the said Railway
Company shall continue to occupy and use the hereinbefore described
lands for the purposes as set out. ... .38
Mr. Justice Fraser noted that the wording of the recital indicated a fee
simple determinable. However this was at variance with a later clause in
the operative part of the deed immediately after the legal description.
This clause contained an express condition that as soon as the Railway
Company ceased to occupy the land for stated purposes it would revert
to the original grantor who would become entitled to enter thereon and
take possession. The habendum which followed was expressed to be
"subject to the above mentioned condition and understanding. '39 On a
review of the entire document it was held that the recital could not
prevail over the operative part of the instrument which included the
grant, the condition and the habendum. The condition, as confirmed by
the habendum, established "a clear and unambiguous grant of a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent" 40 and the estate was categorised
accordingly. 41
Thirdly, reference is sometimes made to the general rule of
construction that if the effect of a clause would be to negate an earlier
provision, the earlier clause will prevail.4 2 It is submitted that this should
be viewed as a proposition of limited application. The rule will not be
adopted if it would serve to defeat the manifest intentions of the parties
or force a tortuous construction of the document.
37. (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 289, [1972] 3 O.R. 16. Affirmed on appeal (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d)
202 (Ont C.A.) [hereinafter Re McKellar cited to 27 D.L.R.].
38. Ibid at 291.
39. Ibid at 292.
40. Ibid at 299.
41. It was further found that the condition as drafted was void for remoteness. For discussion
of the rule against perpetuities see infra.
42. This construction was enunciated by Lord Wrenbury in Forbes v. Git (1921), 61 D.L.R.
353 at 355-56, [1922] 1 WW.R. 250 at 253 (P.C.). However, in the same case, Duff J.
(dissenting) in the Supreme Court of Canada, denounced the rule as being of application "only
in the last resort and when there is no reasonable way of reconciling the two passages and
bringing them into harmony with some intention to be collected from the deed as a whole."
(Git v. Forbes (1921), 62 S.C.R. 1 at 10, 59 D.L.R. 155 at 161). The latter view was endorsed
by Sir Joseph Chisholm C.J. in Kenny v. Kenny, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 243 at 252 (N.S.S.C.).
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In summary, it can be anticipated that words of limitation or condition
will effectively qualify an absolute grant if they are incorporated in the
operative part of the instrument, and particularly the grant clause.
Inconsistencies within the operative part will usually be settled by
reference to the habendum.43 Finally, any conflict between the non-
operative and operative parts will invariably be resolved in favour of the
latter.
3. Conditions and Covenants
A provision that falls short of establishing a condition or limitation will
either give rise to another form of legal interest or else it will simply fail.
The latter is particularly likely when the grantor recites a philanthropic
purpose for conveying property to a public body without expressly
limiting the grant to reflect that intent. In Powell v. City of Vancouver44
recitals in a deed mentioned that the grantee had agreed to construct and
maintain a city hall on a designated site in return for donation of the land.
The grant was silent as to use. Mr. Justice Clement, at trial, held that
mere reference in the recital to the purpose for which the land was
granted did not per se impose a qualification upon the estate. As neither
a condition subsequent nor a resulting trust had been created, the
defendant City took the land as an outright grant.45
On the other hand, a provision in a deed may impose a legal obligation
upon the grantee without actually defeating the estate granted or
operating a forfeiture for condition broken. A stated term may create a
covenant which in its simplest form may constitute a promise that is
enforceable under the ordinary law of contract between the original
parties.46 In certain circumstances it is also possible for a covenant to exist
as an interest in land.47 The distinction between conditions and covenants
43. Conversely, if the operative part is consistent, as where an outright transfer is expressed in
both the grant clause and the habendum, it is most unlikely that any effect will be given to
reservations or limitations contained elsewhere in the deed: King v. Estey (1987), 35 D.L.R.
(4th) 422 (N.B.C.A.).
44. Supra; note 31.
45. Clement J. remarked, without deciding the matter, that the plaintiffs remedy, if any, could
only lie in damages for failure to maintain the hall (1912), 1 W.W.R. 1022 at 1024 (B.C.S.C.).
46. Again, property may be received under circumstances in which it is impressed with a trust
in the hands of the transferee.
47. Covenants run with the land in the following situations: (i) if there is privity of estate,
covenants which touch and concern the land are enforceable at law and equity, (ii) the benefit
of covenants which touch and concern the land are enforceable at common law, and (iii)
equity allows both the benefit and burden of restrictive covenants to run with the land (except
against a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate, for value, without notice) providing there is
both benefited and burdened land. See R.E. Megarry and H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real
Property, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1966) at 724 etseq.
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is sometimes problematic and the relationship between the two has on
occasion proven a source of confusion. 48 This is illustrated in MacLeod v.
Town of Amherst.49 At issue was the wording of a deed that conveyed
lands to the Town of Amherst "for use as a public or community beach
and for other recreational purposes."50 This clause appeared in the recitals
and habendum, but not in the grant. At trial, Mr. Justice MacIntosh ruled
that the grant prevailed over any qualifications or restrictions elsewhere
in the document. The instrument failed to establish a condition
subsequent or a trust. In so finding, MacIntosh J. opined: "If the
provision in the deed is not a condition subsequent it must be a covenant.
It cannot be a nullity. t51 However, as no damages were capable of
assessment the action was dismissed.
The Appeal Division upheld the result but took a more cautious
view.52 It was noted that if the deed was interpreted as creating a
condition subsequent, then the stipulation as to use offended the rule
against perpetuities and was therefore void. No opinion was expressed on
the merits of the trial judge's conclusion that if the provision in question
was not a condition subsequent it must perforce be construed as a
covenant. Mr. Justice Coffin, delivering the judgment of the Court,
indicated that this determination may not have been strictly necessary for
the decision. It was observed however that the approach of Macintosh J.
was supported by the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Pearson v. Adams. 53
It is submitted that it is unsafe to suggest as a general proposition that
a stipulation that fails as a condition subsequent must necessarily be a
covenant giving rise to a cause of action on its breach. It has long been
recognised that an instrument may contain precatory words that are
insufficient to impose a binding obligation on the transferee. If a
particular clause is ineffective, the deed will be interpreted without
reference to it.
Furthermore, Pearson v. Adams does little to buttress the reasoning of
MacIntosh J. in MacLeod v. Town of Amherst. The former case involved
the interpretation of a deed that conveyed land on the basis that it was
... to be used only as a site for a detached brick or stone dwelling-house,
to cost at least two thousand dollars, to be of fair architectural appearance,
48. See Bashir v. Commissioner of Lands, [1960] A.C. 44, [1960] 1 All E.R. 117 (P.C.) and
comment thereon: J.L. Montrose, "Conditions and Promises" (1960), 23 M.L.R. 550.
49. (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 146 (N.S.S.C.T.D.).
50. Ibid at 149.
51. Ibid at 152.
52. (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (N.S.S.C., App. D.).
53. (1914), 50 S.C.R. 204.
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and to be built the same distance from the street line as houses on the
adjoining lots. 4
The matter was heard on appeal before the Divisional Court of
Ontario,5 the Ontario Court of Appeal 6 and ultimately, the Supreme
Court of Canada.57 Despite some differing opinions on other issues, it was
common ground that the provision was not a condition subsequent. The
absence of a right of re-entry was particularly persuasive in this
determination.5 8 Given the form, nature and context of this clause it is not
surprising that it should have been construed as a covenant.5 9 It may be
surmised that the provision was not characterised as a restrictive covenant
because it appears to be positive in nature. As such it would not be
enforced by equity under the doctrine in Tulk v. Moxhay.60 It is more
likely that the stipulation was viewed as a common law covenant, 6' the
benefit of which is enforceable by an assignee.
There is no cogent evidence from the judgements in Pearson v. Adams
that a provision which fails to create a condition must, by default, be
deemed a covenant. The only authority for this claim is the assertion of
Mr. Justice Riddell in the Divisional Court, that: "It is either a condition
or a covenant - it is not simply a mere nullity. ' 62 However, the boldness
of these words must be tempered by their context. Riddell J. went on to
adopt the reasoning of Chief Justice Bigelow in Rawson v. Inhabitants of
School District No. 5 in Uxbridge63 which was commended as presenting
a clear, concise and accurate statement of the law. The latter case
discussed the form and method of creating covenants. In a passage quoted
by Riddell J. at some length, it is apparent that Bigelow C.J.'s
observations were predicated upon the assumption that a deed, on its
proper construction, must be capable of sustaining the necessary elements
of a covenant.64 This seems an obvious qualification. It is axiomatic that
the law cannot give effect to an obligation if the requisite intention cannot
reasonably be adduced from the words and conduct of the parties.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada in Pearson v. Adams
indicated that wherever possible, effect should be given to contractual
54. Ibid, at 205.
55. (1912), 27 O.L.R. 87.
56. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 154.
57. Supra, note 53.
58. Ibid at 208-209 (ldington J.) and 212 (Anglin J.).
59. See supra, note 47.
60. (1848), 18 L.J. Ch. 83, [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 9 (L.C.Ct.).
61. See note 47 supra
62. Supra, note 55 at 92.
63. (1863), 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 125.
64. Supra, note 55 at 92-94.
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terms, 65 their Lordships did not embrace the extreme of suggesting that a
defective condition should be treated as a covenant regardless of whether
it possesses the necessary properties of such an interest.66
The conventional approach to construction is exemplified in Spruce
Grove v. Yellowhead Regional Library Board67 A township had agreed
to convey land to a library board for use as a Regional Library
Headquarters and it was held by Mr. Justice Dea that the absence of
recognised words of limitation or condition were fatal to the creation of
a determinable fee or a condition subsequent. As the requirements of a
covenant giving rise to a real property interest were similarly lacking, this
claim also failed.68
It is apparent that the existence of conditions and covenants can each
be ascertained in their own right, without the attendant assumption that
the absence of one necessarily connotes the presence of the other. The
contrary position can only be advanced by straining certain dicta to a
point that is logically unsupportable.
IV. The Rule Against Perpetuities
A possibility of reverter and a right of re-entry for condition broken
represent distinct modes of determining an estate. A significant
consequence is that one interest is subject to the rule against perpetuities
while the other is not. This has attracted considerable criticism and in
many jurisdictions the common law position has been amended by
statute. The status of determinable interests and interests upon condition
must be examined in both contexts because perpetuities legislation has
modified, but not extinguished, the common law.69
1. Common Law
The rule against perpetuities is summarised by Megarry and Wade in two
succinct propositions:
(i) Any future interest in any property, real or personal, is void from the
outset if it may possibly vest after the perpetuity period has expired.
(ii) The perpetuity period consists of any life or lives in being together
with a further period of 21 years and any period of gestation. 70
65. Supra, note 53 at 209 (Idington J.) and 212 (Anglin J.).
66. As Jessel M.R. observed in Richards P. Delbridge (1874), L.R. 18 Eq. 11 at 14:
"[H]owever anxious the Court may be to carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty to
construe words otherwise than according to their proper meaning."
67. (1985), 59 A.R. 304 (Alta Q.B.).
68. Ibid at 308-309.
69. Manitoba being the one exception to this statement, see infra
70. Supra, note 47 at 215-216.
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The principle is concerned with remoteness of vesting and not the
duration of an interest after it has vested. In the case of a determinable fee
simple, the possibility of reverter is already vested in the grantor at the
time of disposition and therefore the rule against perpetuities has no
application.7' Accordingly, a determinable fee simple is capable of
reverting to the grantor at any time in the future.72 As Mr. Justice Fraser
observed in Re McKellar:
71. Halsbury maintains that it has never been settled whether the rule against perpetuities
applies to a determinable fee simple (33 Halsbury's Statutes, 4th ed. (1987) at 524). Cases are
cited in support of both arguments but it is submitted that the decisions which suggest that this
interest is subject to the rule, are not strongly persuasive. In the first, Re Hollis' Hospital
Trustees and Hague's Contract, [1899] 2 Ch. 540, [1895-9] All E.R. Rep. 643 (Ch. D.)
[hereinafter Re Hollis' Hospital cited to All E.R. Rep.] there was a clear finding by Byrne J.
that the clause in question constituted an express common law condition subsequent. The
remarks on limitations were obiter and not intended as an authoritative pronouncement on this
interest. In the second, Re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218. [1921] All E.R. Rep. 103 (Ch. D.)
it was concluded that the original gift was perpetual and no reversion was left in the donor. The
"clause of reverter" to which Halsbury refers was an executory gift over in favour of the
donor's estate. This disposition was void, being contingent upon a future event that may not
necessarily have occurred within the perpetuity period. Finally, Hopper v. Corporation of
Liverpool (1944), 88 S.J. 213 (Chancery Court of Lancaster) treated possibilities of reverter as
being susceptible to the same reasoning as conditions subsequent for the purposes of the rule
against perpetuities. This approach was compounded by the fact that the Vice-Chancellor
considered himself bound by Re Da Costa, [1912] 1 Ch. 337 and Re Hollis' Hospital supra
neither of which concerned determinable limitations. Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool has
attracted considerable academic criticism: see R.E. Megarry (1946), 62 L.Q.R. 222, Megarry
and Wade, supra; note 47 at 250-251, G.C. Cheshire, The Modern Law of Real Property, 9th
ed. (London: Butterworths, 1962) at 282-283. It is submitted that the preponderant judicial
and academic view is that possibilities of reverter under a determinable fee simple are not
subject to the rule against perpetuities at common law, see Megarry and Wade, supra, note 47
at 250, Anger and Honsberger, supra, note 20 at 127 and 498, J.C. Gray, The Rule Against
Perpetuities, 4th ed. by R. Gray (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1942) at paras. 41 and 113.3.
Canadian cases have adopted this approach: Re St Patrick's Market, supra, note 9 at 93, Re
Tilbury, supra, note 14 at 412-417, Re McKellar, supra, note 37 at 295-296, Fitzmaurice v.
Township of Monck, supra, note 8 at 787-788 and Re Essex, supra, note 13 at 408.
72. The absurdities that can result from an indefinite suspension of a possibility of reverter
were documented by J.H.C. Morris and W.B. Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 2nd ed.
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1962) at 214-215, in an evocative description of Brown v.
Independent Baptist Church of Woburn (1950), 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2D) 922 (Mass.
S.J.C.).
Under the terms of a will, a parcel of land was devised to a Church in 1849 "so long as they
shall maintain and promulgate their present religious belief and faith and shall continue as a
Church." In 1939 the Church ceased operations and the land was sold. It was held that the
estate was a determinable fee simple and the proceeds of sale passed to the successors of ten
persons designated as residuary beneficiaries under the original will. In consequence:
The cost of tracing the persons entitled to the various shares (over a hundred in number)
was nearly half as much as the proceeds of sale of the land, and twenty times as much
as the largest individual share. The smallest individual share amounted to six dollars
and one quarter. The list of modern descendants of two of the original devisees looked
like a genealogy of Methuselah, scattered all the way from California to Buenos Aires.
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I am of the opinion that.., the possibility of reverter... is not subject
to the rule as to perpetuities. The reason behind that rule seems to be that
the perpetuities rule is directed to the vesting of an interest not to its cesser.
Thus when the grantor grants a determinable fee simple he grants an
immediate estate to continue until the occurrence of some future event
which may or may not occur or until some condition ceases to exist he is
merely parting with a part of his estate for that period and retains a vested
interest. Therefore, when the event occurs there is no new vesting and the
possibility of reverter is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.73
A fee simple upon condition subsequent is viewed differently. A right
of re-entry is a future interest and therefore subject to the rule against
perpetuities.74 Thus, a right of re-entry that may arise beyond the
specified period will be void for remoteness. In this event the grantor
cannot defeat the interest he has conveyed and the grantee's estate
becomes absolute.
Although conditions subsequent and determinable limitations are
conceptually distinct, the immunity of the latter from the rule against
perpetuities has, from a practical standpoint, been regarded as
anomalous. Various statutes have endeavoured to redress this by
amending the common law. The scope and effect of this legislation now
falls to be considered.
2. Perpetuities Legislation
The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, (U.K) 196471 introduced
significant reforms to the English law of perpetuities.76 At this point it is
appropriate to review certain features of the Act which served, in large
part, as a model for succeeding Canadian perpetuities legislation.
Of particular note for present purposes, the Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, (UK.) assimilated determinable and conditional fees
73. Supra, note 37 at 295-296.
74. Dunn v. Flood(1883), 25 Ch. D. 629 at 632-633, 53 L.J. Ch. 537 at 539 and (1885), 28
Ch. D. 586 at 592, 54 L.J. Ch. 370 at 374 (C.A.), Re Hollis'Hospital, supra note 71 at 648-
650, Pardee v. Humberstone Summer Resort Company of Ontario Limited [1933] 3 D.L.R.
277 at 285-286, [1933] O.R. 580 at 588-589 (H.C.), Re Tilbury, supra, note 14 at 412-414,
Re North Gower, supra, note 11 at 423-424, Re McKellar, supra, note 37 at 296, Re Essex,
supra, note 13 at 408, Missionary Church, Canada East v. Township of Nottawasaga (1980),
32 O.R. (2d) 88 at 94 (Ont. H.C.). See also Megarry and Wade, supra, note 47 at 79 and 253,
Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property, 14th ed. by E.H. Burn (London:
Butterworths, 1988) at 327-328, Anger and Honsberger, supra note 20 at 496-498.
75. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, (U.K.) 1964, chap. 55.
76. There are two important limitations to the Act. First, it is not retroactive and applies only
to instruments taking effect after July 15, 1964 (sec. 15(5)). Secondly, the common law rules
were not repealed in toto and therefore continue except as modified by this statute. If an
instrument is valid at common law, the saving provisions (infra) of the Act are unnecessary.
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to the extent of making possibilities of reverter subject to the rule against
perpetuities. Section 12 (1) provides:
In the case of-
(a) a possibility of reverter on the determination of a determinable fee
simple, or
(b) a possibility of a resulting trust on the determination of any other
determinable interest in property,
the rule against perpetuities shall apply in relation to the provision causing
the interest to be determinable as it would apply if that provision were
expressed in the form of a condition subsequent giving rise, on breach
thereof, to a right of re-entry or an equivalent right in the case of property
other than land, and where the provision falls to be treated as void for
remoteness the determinable interest shall become an absolute interest.
The Act also established a number of important remedial provisions in
order to save various dispositions. These include presumptions as to
future parenthood, 7 acceleration of expectant interests, 78 reduction of age
and exclusion of class members. 79 Perhaps the most fundamental measure
was the adoption of a "wait and see" rule 0 to mitigate the severity of the
common law requirement that the validity of an interest must be
determined at the time of its creation. Formerly, an interest was void ab
initio if any possibility existed that it might vest outside the relevant
period. 8' The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, (UK) specifies that
where it is uncertain whether a disposition will vest within the perpetuity
period, the interest only becomes invalid when it is actually determined
that vesting must necessarily occur beyond that time.82 Until this is
established the disposition is to be treated as if it was not subject to the
rule.83
77. Supra, note 75, sec. 2.
78. Ibid sec. 6.
79. Ibid sec. 4.
80. Ibid sec. 3.
81. The point is aptly summarised by Halsbury (35 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed.
(1981) at 493-494, para. 908):
An executory devise or other future limitation to be valid must vest, if at all, within a life
or lives in being and twenty-one years and a possible period for gestation after; it is not
sufficient that it may vest within that period. It must be good in its creation, and, unless it
is created in such terms that it cannot vest after the expiration of a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years and the period allowed for gestation, it is not valid, and subsequent events
cannot make it valid.
82. It is also possible at common law to await the outcome of a disposition. The essential
distinction between this and the statutory wait and see formula is that actual events will only
be allowed to determine the effect of a condition at common law if it must, according to its
terms, be incapable of vesting outside the perpetuity period. Thus, the validity of the disposition
for the purpose of the perpetuity rule is not in issue.
83. Supra, note 75, sec. 3.
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From the preceding observations it is possible to address three basic
scenarios as they relate to conditions subsequent and determinable
interests. First, a condition or limitation purporting to terminate an estate
may, according to its terms, be incapable of vesting within the perpetuity
period. It will be void at common law and therefore fail unless saved by
one of the Act's remedial clauses. Secondly, the determining event, if it
occurs at all, may be expressly limited so as to not exceed the perpetuity
period. This will not offend the common law rule. The disposition will be
valid and its effect will depend upon whether the actual event takes place.
If it does, the estate will revert to the grantor or give rise to a right of re-
entry. If it does not, the grantee's estate becomes absolute. Thirdly, it may
be uncertain when the determining event will occur. This typically arises
when a possibility of reverter or right of re-entry are expressed without
time limitation. The former will be valid at common law, but the
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, (UK) now confines its duration to
the perpetuity period. The latter will fail at common law. Under the Act,
however, the wait and see provisions would apply and the status of the
parties' interests would depend upon whether specified events happen
within the perpetuity period.
Following this legislative initiative, the Ontario Law Reform
Commission considered the status of the law against perpetuities.84 In
addressing conditional and determinable estates it was noted that:
Whether a donor uses the technical language of a condition subsequent or
the language of limitation, the property is tied up indefinitely for the
remote future in exactly the same way and therefore if the rule affects the
rights of re-entry, it should also affect the possibility of reverter in order to
free the property from this remote interest. To have a difference in result
depending on a mere matter of words does not seem to make sense and
brings the law into disrepute, as well as acting as a snare for the
draftsman. 5
The Commission concluded that the common law, including
determinable and conditional interests, required amendment. Their
recommendations culminated in An Act to modify the Rule against
Perpetuities.86 This statute is broadly similar to its English predecessor
and includes a wait and see provision, 87 presumptions as to future
parenthood,8 reduction of age and exclusion of class members.89 Again,
84. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report No. I (Toronto, 1965).
85. Ibid at 33.
86. The Perpetuities Act, S.O. 1966, c. 113. Now enacted as R.S.O. 1980 c. 374.
87. Ibid sec. 4.
88. Ibid sec. 7
89. Ibid sec. 8
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possibilities of reverter were subordinated to the rule against perpetuities,
causing the interest to be determinable in the same manner as a condition
subsequent.90 While the Ontario Perpetuities Act generally preserved the
existing common law perpetuity period,9' by way of exception, it
specifically modified the calculation of time in respect of possibilities of
reverter and rights of re-entry. 92 Two subsections must be read together.
Section 15(2) states that in the absence of a life in being, the period shall
be 21 years from the time the interests were created. Section 15(3)
provides that if there are lives in being, the perpetuity period shall not
exceed the lesser of 40 years or a period composed of the relevant life or
lives and 21 years. Thus, if there are no relevant lives, the period is 21
years. If however there are such lives in being, the duration is restricted
to 40 years even though the sum of relevant lives plus 21 years may
otherwise exceed that period.
In 1968 the North West Territories enacted a Perpetuities Ordinance93
that was substantially identical to the Ontario Act and replicated its
treatment of conditional and determinable interests.94 A similar
ordinance was passed by the Yukon in the same year.95
Two years later the status of the common law rule against perpetuities
was reviewed by the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada.96 This led to the adoption of a Draft Uniform Act 97 at the 54th
Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners in August 1972.
The Draft Uniform Act contains wait and see provisions and other
remedial clauses familiar to the English and Ontario Perpetuities Acts.
Again, possibilities of reverter were made subject to the rule against
perpetuities in the same manner as conditions subsequent. 98 The modified
perpetuity period stipulated for these interests differs slightly from the
Ontario Act by simply reciting 40 years without an alternative formula. 99
Unlike the English and Ontario Acts, the Draft Uniform Act exempts
charitable purposes from the general fusion of possibilities of reverter and
90. Ibid sec. 15 (1).
91. Ibid sec. 6.
92. This was based upon the further deliberations of the Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report No. IA (Toronto, 1965) at 8-9.
93. O.N.W.T. 1968,2nd Session, c. 15. Now enacted as R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. P-3.
94. Ibid sec. 16(1).
95. The Perpetuities Ordinance, O.Y.T. 1968, 2nd Session, c. 2. This was superseded by the
Perpetuities Ordinance, O.Y.T. 1980, 1st Session, c. 23, to correspond to the Draft Uniform Act
(infra). Now enacted as R.S.Y. 1986, c. 129.
96. Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada (1970).
97. The Perpetuities Act.
98. Ibids. 19(1).
99. Ibid s. 19 (2).
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conditions subsequent and the accompanying rule that the determinable
interest becomes absolute if the determining event does not occur within
the perpetuity period1t° If the determining event is the cessation of a
charitable purpose, the Draft Uniform Act would allow such an interest
to continue beyond the perpetuity period. 10' Thereafter, if the charitable
purpose terminates, the property is to be applied cy-pres as if it were
subject to a charitable trust. Thus, once the perpetuity period has lapsed,
the interest survives as a curious hybrid: a determinable fee simple bereft
of a possibility of reverter. 02 Nevertheless this statutory exemption avoids
a potential anomaly. Property may be given to an individual or a non-
charitable entity for an express charitable purpose. If the charitable use is
observed until expiration of the perpetuity period, the grantee would then
become seised of an absolute estate. From that point on the property
could be applied for non-charitable purposes. 103
The Draft Uniform Act was prepared and submitted to the Conference
by the Alberta Commissioners. Befittingly, Alberta was the first province
to enact perpetuities legislation""4 modelled on the Draft Uniform Act.
The provisions relating to determinable and conditional interests 05 were
incorporated almost verbatim and a 40 year period was specified."°6
While the British Columbia Perpetuities Act, 1975107 followed other
provincial legislation in reforming the common law in regard to
possibilities of reverter and conditions subsequent, 0 8 no particular period
was indicated for these interests. The term, for perpetuities purposes, is
therefore as provided in the general part of this Act, namely the common
law period, as modified, 109 or alternatively 80 years.110 It has been
suggested that the 80 year formula pertains only to dispositions that are
valid at common law because the wait and see principle does not apply
to this period.1 The 80 year provision appears to invoke the common
law necessity for certainty from the commencement of the interest.112
100. Ibid s. 19 (3).
101. The perpetuity period being 40 years, as provided in s. 19 (2).
102. Perhaps a more satisfactory rationale is that when the possibility of reverter becomes
defunct, the estate is irrevocably dedicated to charity.
103. This concern was identified by the Institute of Law Research and Reform, the University
of Alberta, in Report No. 6, Report on the Rule Against Perpetuities (Edmonton, 1971) at 58.
104. Perpetuities Act, S.A. 1972, s. 121. Now enacted as R.S.A. 1980, c. P-4.
105. Ibid s. 19(1).
106. Ibid s. 19 (2).
107. S.B.C. 1975, c. 53. Now enacted as the Perpetuity Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 321.
108. Ibid s. 20.
109. Ibid s. 1.
110. Ibid ss. 3(1), 6(l)(b).
111. Anger and Honsberger, supra, note 20 at 523-524.
112. The Perpetuity Act supra, note 107, provides:
3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), an interest in property which either
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British Columbia's perpetuity reforms were further buttressed by an
amendment to the Limitation Act. 113 Section 3(5)() states:
... after the expiration of 6 years after the date on which right to do so
arose an action shall not be brought ... for the possession of land by a
person who has a right to enter for breach of a condition subsequent, or
a right to possession arising under possibility of reverter of a determinable
estate.
This gives welcome recognition to a secondary issue that has been
neglected in other provinces."' Providing a determining event occurs
within the perpetuity period, the grantor can notionally seek possession at
any time thereafter. Arguably, unconscionable delay in exercising a right
of re-entry might constitute laches or acquiescence. Yet even this is
doubtful in the case of a possibility of reverter. As the grantee's estate is
automatically determined, no act is required on the part of the grantor;I t5
it follows that no question of delay arises. The Limitation Act removes
such uncertainties and further acknowledges that the status of an estate
cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely.' 16
However, an obvious objection to imposing a common formula upon
different interests is that the reasoning appropriate to one may not
necessarily extend to the other. The application of section 3(5) to
conditional and determinable fees does not escape this criticism. The
resumption of the grantor's estate on breach of a condition subsequent is
contingent upon a prior act, namely re-entry. The Limitation Act bars the
assertion of this claim with the result that the condition subsequent is
nullified. On the other hand, a determinable fee simple cannot be
(a) according to the express terms of the disposition creating it; or
(b) by necessary implication from the terms of the disposition creating it, must vest,
if at all, not later than 80 years after the creation of the interest does not violate
the rule against perpetuities.
113. Formerly the Limitations Act, S.B.C. 1975, c. 37. Now enacted as the Limitation Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236.
114. While other provincial Limitation Acts do not make specific reference to these interests,
it is nevertheless possible that they be caught by general restrictions in respect to proceedings
to recover land. Such proceedings commonly include any action, entry or taking possession by
reason of forfeiture, breach of condition or an interest in reversion.
115. Subject to the qualification that certain procedural steps may be required to enforce the
substantive right, particularly if the grantee remains in possession. This consideration was
discussed by the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia in Report on Limitations, Part
2, (Vancouver, 1974) at 61.
116. Similar views have been espoused in the United States. See, for example, the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law, New York, section 612 which requires a person
entitled to possession or power of termination, to serve a written demand within ten years after
the occurrence of the right to reverter or breach of condition subsequent. Thereafter an action
must be commenced within one year. Alternatively, if no demand is served, an action must be
instituted within ten years. This was based upon the recommendations of the Law Revision
Commission of New York, Leg. Doc. (1963) No. 65 (E).
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described in these terms. The determining event, without more, brings the
grantee's estate to an end. The effect of the Limitation Act is to estop the
grantor from recovering possession notwithstanding that the substantive
event upon which it is based has already occurred by operation of law.
Perpetuities Acts have also been introduced in three other provinces,
but none reflect the approach of modern legislation. The first was passed
by Prince Edward Island in 1931.117 The Act was confined to substituting
a statutory period of a life or lives in being plus 60 years for future
estates.118 No mention was made of determinable and conditional
interests. The purview of Newfoundland's Perpetuities and Accumula-
tions Act,119 was even more limited, its sole purpose being to exclude
employee benefit trusts from the perpetuity rule. Both provinces can
therefore be viewed as common law jurisdictions, the former having an
extended perpetuity period. Finally, it should be noted that Manitoba
alone has taken the sweeping initiative of abolishing the rule against
perpetuities, 20 providing instead that successive legal interests take effect
behind a trust.12' It seems that under such a model, possibilities of reverter
and rights of re-entry enjoy a unique status in that both can be sustained
indefinitely. However, it is doubtful that this was an intended corollary of
Manitoba's Perpetuities and Accumulations Act.'2 2 Elsewhere there is a
pronounced trend towards limiting these interests and it is unlikely that
Manitoba's Legislature proposed to enlarge them. If the matter fell for
judicial determination, a court might be reluctant to uphold an estate in
this form, perhaps on grounds of public policy or uncertainty.
It is apparent that a number of Canadian jurisdictions have moved to
reform the traditional rule against perpetuities. In the process an essential
distinction between limitations and conditions subsequent has been
eliminated. Also, conditions subsequent that might previously have failed
at common law may now be saved. However, two important reservations
117. Perpetuities Act, S.P.E.I. 1931, c. 15. Now enacted as R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. P-3.
118. Ibid sec. 1.
119. S.N. 1955, c. 6. Now enacted as R.S.N. 1970, c. 291.
120. The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 43 (sec. 3). Now enacted
as R.S.M. 1987, c. P. 33. It may be noted that the Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan
also favours abolition of the rule against perpetuities, see "Proposals Relating to the Rules
Against Perpetuities and Accumulations" (Saskatoon, 1987).
121. The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, supra; note 120, s. 4 (1).
122. Supra, note 120.
123. The Perpetuities Act (Ontario), supra, note 86, s. 19 (1966 and 1980 Acts), Perpetuities
Ordinance (North West Territories), supra, note 93, s. 20 (1968 and 1974 Ordinances),
Perpetuities Ordinance (Yukon), supra, note 95, s. 20 (1968 Ordinance), s. 25 (1) (1980
Ordinance) and s. 24 (1986 Act), Perpetuities Act, (Alberta), supra, note 104, s. 25 (1972 and
1980 Acts), Perpetuity Act (British Columbia), supra, note 107, s. 25 (1975 and 1979 Acts).
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should be stated. First, the statutes operate prospectively and have no
application to instruments that took effect at an earlier date.123 It can
therefore be anticipated that for years to come, cases will still have to be
decided without recourse to the legislation. 24 Secondly, some provinces
have yet to introduce perpetuities legislation and thus the common law in
unmodified form continues to provide the basis for ascertaining the
validity of a fee simple upon condition subsequent and a determinable fee
simple.
It is now possible to state the modern application of the perpetuity rule
at common law and statute as it pertains to these interests.
3. The Modern Context
The modern context for the rule against perpetuities in relation to
conditional and determinable interests is most logically approached in
terms of jurisdictions that have enacted perpetuities legislation and those
that have not.
(i) Common Law Jurisdictions
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the common law position in detail.
Suffice it to say that it is essential to identify the nature of the interest. A
fee simple upon condition subsequent will be subject to the perpetuity
rule and the validity of a right of re-entry will be decided accordingly. In
contrast, a determinable fee is unaffected by considerations as to
remoteness of vesting and the possibility of reverter may arise at any time
in the future.
(ii) Statutory Jurisdictions
In provinces where Perpetuities Acts have been passed,125 the first step is
to ascertain the date at which the instrument creating the conditional or
determinable interest took effect. If this occurred before the statute was in
force, then the status of the disposition will be determined at common
law without reference to the Act. In these circumstances the distinction
between a conditional and determinable fee will be fundamental.
If a Perpetuities Act was in force at the time the interest took effect,
there are several possible permutations. If a fee simple on condition
subsequent has been created, its status at common law must first be
124. For example, see Re North Gower, supra, note 11 at 424, Re Essex, supra note 13 at
408, Re McKellar, supra, note 37 at 297.
125. The following analysis is generally inapplicable to the perpetuities legislation of
Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.
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resolved. Usually legislation expressly reserves the modern rule against
perpetuities so that the statutory modifications only come into play if the
interest would otherwise fail. Where the right of re-entry is framed so as
to be incapable of operating outside the perpetuity period, the condition
is valid and the Act has no application. The estate will be forfeited if the
condition is broken within the relevant time and the grantor or his estate
elects to re-enter. Conversely, if re-entry may possibly arise beyond the
perpetuity period, the condition will be void at common law and the Act
can be invoked to save it. Applying the wait and see principle, the interest
will be presumptively valid until actual events establish that it is
incapable of vesting within the perpetuity period. As previously
mentioned, the period for both conditional and determinable fees has
usually been modified by statute to a maximum of forty years.
If the grantor has created a determinable fee simple, the possibility of
reverter becomes subject to the perpetuity period by virtue of the statute.
The Acts provide that where a determining event does not occur within
the prescribed period, it shall be treated as void and the determinable
interest becomes absolute.
It should be emphasised that the distinction between limitations and
conditions has not been rendered entirely redundant under the statutory
scheme. For example, a right of re-entry which is valid for the purposes
of the perpetuities rule may nonetheless fail for an independent reason, as
where the right can no longer be exercised by the grantor. Such
considerations would not apply to possibilities of reverter which
automatically determine an estate without any act of the grantor.
V. Related Legislation
In considering the modern context of determinable and conditional fees
it should be borne in mind that these estates may be affected by various
statutes in addition to the perpetuities legislation previously discussed.
Certain Acts appear to abolish or at least cast doubt upon these interests
while others serve to qualify or curtail their application. It is evident that
their status in any given province can therefore only be understood after
a careful review of both specific and general legislation. By way of
illustration, provisions in Saskatchewan's Land Titles Act1 26 and
Manitoba's Law of Property Act 127 may be interpreted as having
abolished any right to impose limitations upon a fee simple. Other
legislation, such as the Ontario Education Act128 accepts the existence of
126. R.S.S 1978, c. [,5.
127. R.S.M. 1987, c. L 90.
128. R.S.O. 1980, c. 129.
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such rights, but abridges the period in which they can be exercised. These
two aspects will be considered in turn.
1. Extinguishing of Interests
Most Canadian jurisdictions have taken the initiative of abolishing estates
tail.129 However, in some instances uncertainty has arisen as to whether
the reforming statute has also extinguished determinable and conditional
fees. This is particularly borne out in the Saskatchewan Land Titles AcL
Section 243 provides:
No estate in fee simple shall be changed into any limited fee or fee tail, but
the land, whatever form of words is used in any transfer, transmission or
dealing, shall, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, be and remain an
absolute estate in the owner for the time being. (emphasis added)
It may be questioned whether this effectively abolishes the creation of
determinable fees and, by extension, conditions subsequent. The purview
of the section is unclear and the matter does not seem to have been raised
in any reported decisions. It may be conjectured that express words
would have been used to identify determinable and conditional fees if a
fundamental reform of these interests had been contemplated. Some
support for this view can be drawn from the fact that the heading of
section 243 is simply entitled "No Estates Tail." Furthermore, although
not conclusive on the point, the Law Reform Commission of
Saskatchewan noted the existence of determinable limitations and
conditions subsequent in its report on the rules against perpetuities and
accumulations.1 30
A similar provision in the Manitoba Law of Property Act contains an
additional refinement that offers some insight as to its intended scope.
The pertinent section reads:
30 (4) No estate in fee simple shall be changed into any limited fee or fee
tail, but whatever form of words is used in any instrument, the land shall
be and remain an estate in fee simple in the owner; and any limitation that
would have created an estate tail shall transfer the estate in fee simple or
absolute ownership that the transferor has in the land.
The effect of this section hinges, in part, on whether "any limitation that
would have created an estate tail" in the latter clause serves to qualify and
restrict the ambit of "limited fee" in the former.131 Logic and consistency
129. A concise review of the relevant legislation is contained in Anger and Honsberger, supra,
note 20 at 144-146.
130. Supra, note 120 at 20-21.
13 1. The latter clause of sec. 30 (4) Manitoba Law of Property Act is basically repeated in the
Saskatchewan Land Titles Act as a separate section. Section 244 provides:
Any limitation that heretofore would have created an estate tail shall transfer the absolute
ownership or the greatest estate that the transferor had in his land.
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indicate that it should, although this in turn begs the question as to why
a limited fee should be mentioned at all if it was meant to be nothing
more than a synonym for a fee tail. As in the case of the Saskatchewan
Act, the section is entitled "No estates tail" and it is submitted that on
balance, this provision, like its Saskatchewan counterpart, should be
construed as being confined to that interest. If this was indeed the
intention of the Manitoba and Saskatchewan Acts, it is unfortunate that
they failed to address the subject with the same directness as
corresponding legislation in other jurisdictions. 132
Such uncertainties do not beset British Columbia's property legislation.
While the Property Law Act'33 abolishes estates tail in terms similar to
section 243 of the Saskatchewan Land Titles Act, the British Columbia
statute removes any attendant doubts by specifying that "[tjhis Act does
not prevent the creation of a determinable fee simple or a fee simple
defeasible by condition subsequent."'' 34
The Property Law Act also affirms that a possibility of reverter and
right of entry for condition broken may be registered under the Land Title
Act 135 against title to land in the same manner as a charge. 136 This touches
upon a fundamental consideration, namely the role of these common law
interests in jurisdictions that have adopted a Torrens system of land
registration. British Columbia's legislation explicitly addresses this. While
other provinces also seem to recognise limitations and conditions
subsequent under the Torrens system, this conclusion arises only
inferentially from the fact that reported cases and related legislation
appear to accept their existence.
2. Modification of Interests
A further category of legislation fulfils a modest reforming function in
reducing the period within which possibilities of reverter and rights of re-
entry can be exercised or modifying the terms on which property is held.
Such statutes may not necessarily refer to conditional or determinable
fees as such, but their language may be sufficiently broad to include both
interests. Generally these provisions relate to property in a limited class of
132. For example, the Nova Scotia Real Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 261, s. 5 simply
states:
All estates tail are abolished; and every estate which hitherto would have been adjudged
a fee tail, shall hereafter be adjudged a fee simple, and may be conveyed and devised
or descend as such.
133. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 340, s. 10 (1).
134. Ibid, s. 10 (3).
135. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 219.
136. Supra, note 133, s. 10(4).
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ownership and entitle the grantee to institute proceedings for an
appropriate declaration or order. Thus, in British Columbia, a University
Foundation may apply to a judge of the Supreme Court for an order
varying the directions, terms or trusts imposed by a donor, settlor,
transferor or testator in respect of property which it holds.137 In Ontario,
the Education Act 138 empowers a school board to petition the Supreme
Court for the removal of restrictions relating to land that has been vested
in the board for a minimum period of 50 years. The application of the
Education Act to determinable and conditional interests has been
examined in a number of cases and therefore this statute may be taken as
a convenient illustration of some of the issues that can arise in
proceedings of this kind.
Section 170 (2) of the Education Act states:
Where land, the use of which is restricted by deed in any manner to school
purposes so as to appear that some other person may have an interest
therein, has been vested in a board for at least fifty years, the board may
apply to the Supreme Court to remove the restriction, and the Supreme
Court may make such order on the application as it considers just
including, where the land adjoins land being used as a farm, a requirement
that the board shall, where the board intends to sell the land, first offer it
at a reasonable price to the owner or owners of such adjoining land.139
It should be noted at the outset that the requirement of 50 years vesting
precludes any consideration of the Perpetuities Act1 40 which is confined
to dispositions made after the Act came into force.
A preliminary question arises as to whether the restriction referred to
in section 170(2) contemplates determinable limitations and conditions
subsequent. Despite the apparent breadth of its wording, the section has
attracted contrary views in two High Court decisions.
In Re Tilburyt4t Mr. Justice Grant indicated that a similar provision
under former legislation (section 9a of the Public Schools Act t 42) did not
137. University Foundations Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 50, s. 10 (2).
138. Supra, note 128.
139. Land held under grant from the Provincial Crown is covered by a different procedure.
Section 13 of the Education Amendment Act, S.O. 1984, c. 60 provides:
A board that is in possession of real property that was originally granted by the Crown
for school purposes and that has reverted or may have reverted to the Crown may
continue in possession of the real property for school purposes and when the board
determines that the real property is no longer required for school purposes, the board
may, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council and subject to such
conditions as are prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the real property.
140. Supra, note 86.
141. Supra, note 14.
142. R.S.O. 1960, c. 330 as enacted by S.C. 1964, c. 95, s 2.
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extend to possibilities of reverter. Grant J. was of the opinion that the Act
only governed situations where a school board acquired the entire
estate. 43 This would exclude a determinable fee, but not a fee simple
upon condition subsequent.
A different view was expressed in a later Ontario decision, Re Essex,144
where Mr. Justice Krever held that a corresponding section in the
Education Act 1974,145 encompassed both interests. It was observed that
the provision evinced
[A] legislative intent that the Court be empowered to remove a restriction,
whatever its nature, and whatever the nature of the interest in the land of
any person other than a school board, provided only that the land.., has
been in the public domain for 50 years, in the sense that it has been used
for school purposes.'16
It is submitted that the approach in Re Essex is to be preferred. Re
Tilbury adopts a somewhat narrow definition of vesting and forces a
distinction upon a section that does not require further qualification.
In removing a restriction under section 170(2) of the Education Act,
the Supreme Court may "make such order as it considers just." It is thus
at liberty to impose terms in granting an application. In Re Essex a school
board obtained an order removing a reservation in favour of the grantor,
subject to the condition that the Board forthwith offer to sell the land to
the grantor's successor at fair market value. Krever J remarked that if the
application had not been brought under the Education Act, the Board
would have been entitled to a declaration that it held an absolute fee
simple. 47 It follows that the manner in which an action is framed may
have some bearing upon the form of order granted. If a condition seems
void for perpetuity, a school board could seek a declaration to that effect
without recourse to the Education Act, thereby obviating the discretion
conferred under that statute. The feasibility of this approach will of
course depend upon the facts of each case. For example, a possibility of
reverter created more than 50 years ago would predate the Ontario
Perpetuities Act and thus constitute an indefinite cloud on the title. This
limitation could only be impugned by bringing proceedings under the
Education AcL Similarly, a right of re-entry under an instrument taking
effect prior to the Perpetuities Act may be capable of enforcement in
excess of 50 years from the date of the original grant providing it is
143. Supra, note 14at 417-418.
144. Supra, note 13.
145. The Education Act, S.O. 1974, c. 109, s. 167(2).
146. Supra, note 13 at 407.
147. Ibid at 412.
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properly limited so as to not offend the common law rule against
perpetuities. In these circumstances, an action under the Education Act
would offer an appropriate means of confining the period to 50 years.
The observations of Krever J. in Re Essex may be contrasted with
those of Mr. Justice Laskin in Re North Gowerl4 8 where the Ontario
Court of Appeal commented upon the ambit of section 9a of the Public
Schools Act. 49 A conveyance of land to a school board purported to
reserve to the grantor a right to recover the property if it ceased to be used
as a public school site. This was held to be a condition subsequent that
was void for perpetuity. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Laskin
J.A. noted that section 9a did not have to be invoked by the School
Board because the restriction was invalid. The statutory remedy was only
required when a board sought relief from an enforceable condition.I10
In Re North Gower the parties were vendor and purchaser. Unlike Re
Essex, the rights of the original grantor or his successors were not in issue.
It may be questioned whether the statement of Laskin J.A. was intended
as an immutable principle, to be applied even where its effect would be
to frustrate a court from imposing terms. This potential conflict will arise
in situations where a school board holds property subject to an invalid
restriction that could have been expunged in proceedings unrelated to the
Education Act. If, out of an abundance of caution, or through
inadvertence or otherwise, an application was brought under section 170
(2), it would arguably be open to a court to maintain that while the
Education Act need not strictly have been invoked, the school board had
nevertheless chosen to submit itself to the statutory jurisdiction and the
obligations that accompany it.'
VI. The Direction of Reform
The status of a determinable fee simple at common law is clearly
unsatisfactory. There is no useful purpose in subjecting an estate to an
indefinite period of certainty. An obvious objection is that the grantor's
ability to affect the ultimate ownership of land at any time in the future
may render the title unmarketable. The existence of such a fetter runs
transverse to the philosophy of modern property law. 52 As a result there
148. Supra, note 1I.
149. Supra, note 142.
150. Supra note 11 at 425.
151. See Re Essex, supra note 13 at 408.
152. See A.J. McClean, "The Rule Against Perpetuities, Saunders v. Vautier, and Legal
Future Interests Abolished" (1983), 13 Man. LJ. 245, which canvasses the competing interests
of freedom of disposition versus public policy against withdrawing property from the inventory
of commerce for excessive periods of time.
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is now an established trend towards subordinating possibilities of reverter
to a defined perpetuity period. Insofar as this remains to be implemented
in some jurisdictions, the initiative is to be encouraged. To this a caveat
must be entered. Current legislation does not operate retroactively.
Consequently, two inconsistent systems are in place, one pertaining to
dispositions taking effect before legislation was in force and another
pertaining to transactions governed by the modern Perpetuities Acts.
While retroactive enactments should be approached with caution, it is
submitted that there is a clear advantage in treating all dispositions
alike. 153 The goals of consistency and certainty must surely be preferable
to the perpetuation of sophistry from a bygone age.
In canvassing further options for reform there is a superficial appeal to
enfranchising determinable and conditional estates. However, converting
a fee simple into an absolute interest could produce unfairness in
situations where the grantor may legitimately assert a claim to the
property. If land is donated on the clear understanding that it is to be used
for a stated purpose, it becomes a question of fact as to whether it is
reasonable for the donor to recover the property upon breach of the
condition. In this regard the suspension of absolute ownership for a
certain period may be seen as a quidpro quo for acquiring land without
payment. The reasonableness of a right to forfeiture is largely a function
of time. If the condition is broken within a few years of the transfer, the
grantor may validly seek recovery on the ground that he was improperly
induced to part with the property. The perspective changes if the same
event occurs at some remote future date when the stipulation has no
contemporary relevance. Here, reverter to the grantor or his estate merely
confers a gratuitous windfall.
A balance can be achieved by confining the right of re-entry of reverter
to a specified period. It has been previously noted that a number of
provinces have adopted this approach by establishing a limit of forty
years. This may often prove shorter than the common law formula of a
life or lives in being and twenty-one years. The benefit of abridging the
153. To this, objection might be voiced by those who drafted reservations and structured
transactions based upon the state of the common law before perpetuities legislation was passed.
At present such dispositions are valid under the old law. To place this group in perspective, it
should be noted that in order to predate the Perpetuities Acts, these interests would have been
created at least 15-20 years ago. As the Perpetuities Acts affected determinable limitations
more profoundly than conditions subsequent, the class of documents that would be most
impacted by retroactive legislation are those reserving an indefinite possibility of reverter to the
grantor. It is submitted that on balance, the arguments in favour of consistency and freedom
of disposition, outweigh any prejudice to those who availed themselves of what is now
regarded as an excessive restraint upon land.
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period is that any claim to the estate will be asserted within a time frame
that bears some relationship to the original disposition. As such it
provides a realistic format for the expectations of the parties.
Furthermore it dispenses with the need for ascertaining measuring lives
and making a determination as to their status.154
An argument can also be made for specifying a time limit within which
re-entry or reverter can be asserted once a determining event has
occurred. This is a logical extension of the statutory provisions restricting
the duration of limitations and conditions. The point is addressed in
British Columbia's Limitation Act which may be commended for
consideration by other jurisdictions. In the same spirit it should be open
for an owner of land to apply at any time after the perpetuity period has
expired, for a declaration that the interest of the grantor has been
extinguished. Assuming a statutory perpetuity period of 40 years, and
say, a 6 year limitation period for enforcement, the status of the grantee's
estate could theoretically be uncertain for a total of 46 years if the
determining event occurred in the fortieth year. An ability to shorten the
limitation period would provide a means of redress for such anomalies
and enable the registered owner to ascertain the grantor's position in
respect of any possible claim to the estate.
Incongruously, to establish that the period has expired it would be
necessary for the grantee to aver his own act of defeasance as having
commenced the running of the limitation period. In other circumstances
this might give rise to an issue of estoppel. Moreover, to resist the motion,
the grantor would have to allege that the conduct of the grantee did not
constitute breach of condition. The role of the parties would therefore be
curiously reversed. Notwithstanding this objection, such a proposal has
the merit of avoiding further deferral of any uncertainty as to the status
of a title.
If a limited right of re-entry or reverter should be retained in order to
preserve the grantor's remedy for breach, it may be asked whether it is
similarly necessary to maintain both forms of interest. Although many
jurisdictions have unified the application of conditional and determinable
interests to the rule against perpetuities, some differences between the two
estates still remain. This does not, however, furnish any justification for
keeping two separate interests. It is recommended that they be merged. In
this regard it would be preferable for limitations under a determinable fee
154. As Ontario and the North West Territories specify the lesser of 40 years or a life in being
plus 21 years, it will be necessary to calculate on the basis of the latter if it is claimed that the
perpetuity period has expired prior to 40 years.
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simple to be treated as conditions. The latter are strictly construed. Courts
are vigilant to ensure that a clause of defeasance is reasonable in terms of
public policy and that it evinces sufficient certainty to be enforceable. A
degree of stringency is desirable in these circumstances, for the effect of
the condition is to expose a registered interest to forfeiture. Further, if
there is an impediment to re-entry or if the right cannot be exercised (as
where the grantor is a defunct corporate entity) this will conclusively
dispose of the matter. By contrast, reverter under a determinable fee
occurs automatically and failure by the grantor to immediately assert his
interest merely leaves the issue in abeyance.
In the final analysis there is little practical justification for preserving in
two forms what is essentially the same disposition. The amalgamation of
conditional and determinable fees would accord with the general
movement towards simplifying estates and interests in land and eliminate
the pitfalls of construction that have been the draftsman's perennial bete
noire.
VII. Conclusion
While determinable and conditional fees continue to fulfil a need in
respect of certain dispositions, the manner in which that function is
accomplished can at best receive qualified approval. As a general
proposition there should be no objection in principle to an effective
mechanism for restoring land to the grantor when the understanding
upon which it was transferred has been breached. This is particularly so
when property has been donated for a specific public purpose and the
grantee seeks to profit by its sale.
At the same time, the proper scope and application of this remedy is
a question of degree. Determination of an estate is an extreme measure
which should only be exercised within defined limits. In this regard it is
clearly unproductive for a title to be clouded indefinitely by a possibility
of reverter. Notably, this situation still obtains in a number of
jurisdictions that have yet to implement reform. In these cases the validity
of dispositions continue to be governed by narrow and inflexible rules of
construction.
Perpetuities legislation has struck a workable balance by removing the
excesses of both determinable and conditional interests. The unlimited
duration of a possibility of reverter is incompatible with present thinking
and its restriction to a defined perpetuity period is the obvious corrective.
It has been seen that rights of re-entry have often been defeated by the
strictness of the perpetuity rule. In the process, the grantee has been
gratuitously relieved of any obligations and his enjoyment of the estate
has been enlarged to an absolute interest. Thus, the statutory wait and see
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provisions represent an appropriate relaxation of the common law
requirement of certainty of vesting.
These initiatives have removed the most significant practical
distinctions between conditions subsequent and determinable limitations.
What is left is simply not worth preserving. It cannot be suggested that
the maintenance of two interests fulfils any worthwhile purpose in the
context of modern property law. The associated complexities can only be
viewed as remnants of an age when form was a rival to substance. The
goals of simplicity and consistency dictate that the interests should be
unified and it has been proposed that conditions subsequent could serve
that generic function. This would ensure that future relations between
those who give and receive real property on conditions, are governed by
a measure of certainty that has hitherto proven so elusive.
